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Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of import liberalization induced labor demand shocks on
male and female employment in China. Combining data from population and firm censuses
between 1990 and 2005, we relate prefecture-level employment by gender to the exposure to
tariff reductions on locally imported products. Our empirical results show that increasing
import competition has kept more females in the workforce, reducing an otherwise growing
gender employment gap in the long run. These dynamics were present both in local economies
as a whole and among formal private industrial firms. Examining channels through which
tariff reductions differentially affect males and females, we find that trade-induced competitive
pressures contributed to a general expansion of female-intensive industries, a shift in sectoral
gender segregation, reductions in gender discrimination in the labor market, technological
upgrading through computerization, and general income growth.
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1 Introduction
Since the 1990s, China has substantially opened up its goods market to global trade.
Accompanied by several other additional market reforms, trade liberalization has had a major
impact on the Chinese economy, contributing to rising firm-level productivity (Yu, 2015; Brandt
et al., 2017), lower markup dispersion (Lu and Yu, 2015), increased wage inequality and skill
premiums (Han et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2017; Xu, 2019), and household adjustments of labor
supply, saving, and co-residence (Dai et al., 2018), among other things. A few recent studies have
also documented both substantial job creation and job destruction within the manufacturing
sector due to China’s trade liberalization policies (Ma et al., 2015; Rodriguez-Lopez and Yu, 2017).
Yet less is known about the long-run and gender-specific effects of globalization, especially in
combination with the economy-wide dynamics of market reforms.1
Before its entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO), China’s employment rates were
historically high and did not differ substantially by gender. At the time of the 1990 Population
Census of China, about 90.3 percent of prime working-age males (15-50 years old) and 84.8
percent of females of the same age were employed. Transformation towards a market economy
has led to larger declines in the employment rates of females than of males, leading to the
emergence of a more substantial gender employment gap (see Figure A.1 in the Appendix,
also documented by Chi and Li 2014). In this paper, we address to what extent trade
liberalization policies contributed to gender-specific employment trends and the growing
gender employment gap.
Regions more exposed to import competition can be expected to experience larger adjustments
in their local labor markets. Labor demand will decline if important local import-competing
firms face negative price shocks and reduce production. But labor demand can also increase if
competitive pressures lead to factor substitution towards labor, or if technological upgrading
increases demand for complementary workers (Bloom et al., 2016). Moreover, lower tariff
rates on intermediate inputs improve access to a larger variety of intermediate goods, directly
increasing firm productivity and employment (Goldberg et al., 2010). At the same time, labor
supply may decrease because of increased incentives to invest in higher education among
younger cohorts (Li, 2018; Li et al., 2019), or it may adjust because of changing average household
incomes (Dai et al., 2018) and reservation wages. By focusing on local labor markets, we are able
to assess the effects of predominantly demand-side factors on changes in the Chinese gender
employment gap over time.
The labor market effects of trade liberalization could be gender-specific for a variety of reasons.
From the demand side, trade-induced competition could reduce taste-based discrimination and
increase the relative demand for female workers (Becker, 1957; Black and Brainerd, 2004; Hirata
and Soares, 2016). Firms may also increase investments in technology as a response to import
competition (Bloom et al., 2016). If computerization and technological upgrading reduce the
demand for physical strength, which was once the primary comparative advantage for male
1Chen et al. (2013) and Dai et al. (2018) are two exceptions, with the former considering gender differences within
exporting firms descriptively, and the latter focusing on within-household adjustments to import competition in the
short run.
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workers, females’ position in the labor market may improve (Juhn et al., 2014). Additionally,
if social norms or individual preferences lead to sustained sectoral gender segregation in the
workforce, trade-induced structural change will also lead to gender-specific shifts in labor
demand. Under these conditions, the expansion of female-intensive sectors may increase the
demand for female workers relative to male workers (Gaddis and Pieters, 2017; Kis-Katos et
al., 2018), but may also reduce females’ relative employment if male workers migrate from
male-intensive to female-intensive sectors (Sauré and Zoabi, 2014). Finally, from the supply side,
females’ decisions to enter the labor market will also depend on shifts in household income
(Klasen and Pieters, 2015; Klasen, 2019).
In our empirical analysis, we use the local labor market approach to uncover the differential
adjustments of male and female workers following trade liberalization within Chinese
prefectures in a long-difference setting, focusing mainly on changes from 1990 to 2005. This
approach relies on a shift-share measure (Bartik, 1991) that combines industry-level variation
in tariff rate reductions with differences in initial sectoral labor market composition across
prefectures, and relates changes in local labor market outcomes to regionalized measures of tariff
changes.2 We measure prefecture-level employment based on locally representative individual
data from two waves of the population census (1990 and 2005). As a complementary source of
information, we also use firm-level data from the 1995 industrial census and the 2004 economic
census. The approach assumes limited worker mobility across regions, while allowing for
worker reallocation across sectors within each region. The assumption partially holds in the
Chinese context, in which the household registration system resulted in substantial migration
barriers across regions, at least before 2005 (Meng, 2012). Nonetheless, we also show that our
results persist when focusing on non-migrants only.
Our results indicate that while employment rates declined considerably for both men and
women over time, the reduction in import tariffs kept relatively more females within the labor
force, mitigating increases in the gender employment gap. These effects were present among
both high-skilled and low-skilled workers, and among all age cohorts except for the youngest
(15–25 years old), who experienced an educational expansion during the same time period.
We find similar patterns for the formal industrial sector, but clear heterogeneity between state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) and private enterprises. While workers tended to move from SOEs
to private enterprises overall, this process was accelerated by the competitive pressures arising
from import competition. Although private industrial firms hired more males than females
on average, they responded to import competition by increasing female employment, which
reduced the gender employment gap.
The gender effects of trade liberalization in China arose through various channels. First, we find
evidence that import tariff reductions expanded sectors which were originally more female-
intensive, while at the same time reducing within-firm discrimination, measured by profit
differentials between firms with differing numbers of female employees. Sectoral segregation by
gender in the local employment market tended to decrease with tariff reductions, although it did
not decrease significantly among formal industrial firms. All these factors may have contributed
2This approach has been widely used to examine the local labor market effects of tariff reductions (see
e.g. Topalova, 2010, Kis-Katos and Sparrow, 2015, Dix-Carneiro and Kovak, 2017, and Li, 2018, among others).
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to a reduced gender employment gap. Second, we find evidence that computerization expanded
more in private industrial firms which faced increasing import competition, but did not expand
in the local economies on average. This result partially confirms the relevance of trade-induced
technological upgrading. Finally, import tariff reductions were also linked to aggregate increases
in economic activity, as proxied by nightlights. Thus, in the long run, we do not expect
substantial negative income effects from import competition, at least not on average. Since
females are more likely to exit the labor market than males with higher household incomes,
aggregate income increases may have limited the decline in the gender employment gap;
however, we do not find direct evidence to support this.
Our paper contributes to two main strands of the literature. First, we contribute to the growing
body of literature on the labor market effects of trade liberalization in China (Ma et al., 2015;
Rodriguez-Lopez and Yu, 2017; Dai et al., 2018) by focusing particularly on gender differentials
in long-run employment dynamics and their potential causes. Our paper differs from these
studies by not only considering formal manufacturing firms (like Ma et al., 2015; Rodriguez-
Lopez and Yu, 2017), but also by measuring employment within local labor markets. Since the
size of the informal sector in China has surpassed the formal sector in recent years (Liang et al.,
2016), and since informal workers may respond differently to trade liberalization (Ben Yahmed
and Bombarda, 2020), extending the analysis beyond formal manufacturing firms helps us to
measure the full impact of trade liberalization on employment. In contrast to Dai et al. (2018), we
focus on a large set of prefectures instead of only fewer selected urban prefectures, as well as the
long-run effects of tariff reforms instead of the effects of short-run, year-by-year tariff variations.
Second, we contribute to the literature studying the drivers of the gender gap in labor
participation in developing countries in general, and the role of globalization in particular.
Decreasing female labor force participation has been previously linked to urbanization (de Bruin
and Liu, 2020), rising returns to education (Hare, 2016), increasing discrimination (Li and
Song, 2013), higher costs of childcare and old age support (Maurer-Fazio et al., 2011), as well
as changes in social norms (Hare, 2016; Chen and Ge, 2018). Studies on the gender effects
of trade liberalization in developing countries document the role of import competition or
export expansion for explaining changes in the gender gap in Brazil (Gaddis and Pieters, 2017),
Indonesia (Kis-Katos et al., 2018), or Mexico (Juhn et al., 2014; Ben Yahmed and Bombarda,
2020).
While the existing studies rely solely on either individual-level labor census data, household-
level survey data (Gaddis and Pieters, 2017; Kis-Katos et al., 2018; Ben Yahmed and Bombarda,
2020), or firm-level survey data (Juhn et al., 2014), this paper instead combines both large-scale
population and firm census data, with the former capturing total employment adjustment within
local regions and the latter reflecting employment adjustment within the formal industrial sector,
thereby providing a more comprehensive and nuanced picture of labor market adjustments
following trade liberalization.
Importantly, the firm-level census data allows for separate investigations into employment
adjustments in state and private sectors, which have not yet been examined in the literature. The
differential employment adjustments between state-owned and private enterprises following
the tariff reductions imply that an expansion of the private sector has played an important role
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in shaping the gendered effects of trade liberalization. While our finding that tariff reductions
reduced the gender employment gap is consistent with previous studies, we additionally test
several possible channels against each other and hence contribute to a better understanding of
why trade induced import competition affects males and females differently.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the
institutional context and survey the evidence on the labor market effects of tariff reforms in
China. Section 3 presents our data sources, reports descriptive statistics, introduces measures of
regional exposure to tariff reductions, and describes the empirical strategy. Section 4 reports
empirical results, section 5 examines potential channels, and section 6 concludes.
2 Trade reforms and labor market adjustments in China
Following its application for WTO membership in 1995, and in particular after its formal entry
into the WTO in December 2001, China substantially reduced its import tariffs, fulfilling the
majority of its tariff-reduction commitments by 2005.3 As shown in Figure 1, there has been a
strong convergence in tariff rates over time: average import tariff rates declined from over 40
percent in the early 1990s to 10 percent in 2005, and stayed fairly constant since then. These tariff
reforms led to a substantial surge in imports, raising the competitive pressures on domestic
import-competing firms but also improving access to imported inputs.
During this same time period, employment rates declined among both males and females, with
larger declines among females, which led to a widening gender employment gap. Figure A.1 in
the Appendix shows employment rates by gender among the full adult population according
to ILO definitions (aged 15 years or older), whereas Table 1 reports employment rates in the
working-age population according to Chinese definitions (aged 15 to 50 years) in 1990 and
2005. The employment rate of working-age males decreased from 90.4 percent to 81.9 percent
from 1990 to 2005, and from 84.8 percent to 71.6 percent for females (see Table 1). Employment
declines resulted in only slight increases in the unemployment rate and were mostly linked to an
increase in the non-participation rate, especially among the younger cohorts. Employment rates
fell most strongly among the youngest cohort (15 to 25 years old), with similar average dynamics
among both genders. In contrast, the male-female employment gap increased the most among
the 26–35 year old cohort, which are among the primary child-bearing age, and could also
reflect rising household incomes (Hare, 2016) or higher costs of child-rearing (Maurer-Fazio et
al., 2011).
A rapidly expanding body of empirical literature documents the substantial labor market effects
of the increasing import competition in China. Trade liberalization has simultaneously induced
job creation and job destruction, resulting in net job growth in the formal manufacturing
sector (Ma et al., 2015). Import competition-induced job destruction was concentrated in low-
productivity firms, while high-productivity firms created additional jobs (Rodriguez-Lopez and
Yu, 2017). In the short run, import competition also led to wage declines in urban households,
who responded by increasing household labor supply, depleting assets, and pursuing other
strategies of cost-cutting (Dai et al., 2018).
3http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7143951.htm
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Import tariff reductions capture only one dimension, albeit an important one, of trade
liberalization. During our period of analysis, China underwent a whole series of further
trade policy-related reforms, all of which may confound the employment effects of import tariff
reductions. As part of its trade policy reforms following its accession to the WTO, China also
reduced non-tariff barriers (NTBs), further opening the domestic market for imports. China also
lowered its foreign direct investment (FDI) restrictions, which may have particularly benefited
females by bringing less discriminatory gender norms (Juhn et al., 2014; Tang and Zhang, 2017).
Descriptive evidence also shows that in 2004 foreign-invested firms (as well as exporters) had
on average a higher share of female workers than domestic non-exporters did (Chen et al.,
2013). China’s WTO accession also brought about considerable improvements in its export
market access. Starting in 2000, China received permanent Normal Trade Relations (NTR)
status from the U.S., which reduced tariff uncertainties and led to increased exports (Pierce and
Schott, 2016). Increases in labor demand led to additional migration inflows in prefectures that
experienced a larger decline in this tariff uncertainty (Facchini et al., 2019). Finally, improving
export market access towards all potential trading partners in general has also been shown to
shift patterns of human capital accumulation (Li, 2018). In sensitivity tests, we will control for
all these alternative dimensions of globalization-related policy reforms.
3 Data sources and empirical strategy
3.1 Data sources
We measure local employment by gender primarily based on the 1990 and 2005 waves of
the population census. The former is a 1 percent random sample obtained from IPUMS-
International (Minnesota Population Center, 2019), while the latter comes from the National
Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of China.4 The long-difference analysis of changes over 15 years
allows us to capture the long-run employment effects of trade liberalization. The two waves of
the population census record individual information, including demographic characteristics,
working status, industry, occupation, location of residence, and migration status. Since the
1990 population census does not directly report an individual’s working status but rather
reports their industry and occupation, we identify an individual as being employed if either the
industry or the occupation code is not missing. The census waves also report on other full-time
activities, categorized as education, retirement, disability, or housework. This further helps to
identify employment status.
The 1 percent random sample of the 1990 population census and the 2005 mini-census are
representative at the level of Chinese prefectures, which can be considered as representing
local labor markets. More importantly, they include both formal and informal employment
in all sectors, and hence show a more complete picture of the labor market. They also report
detailed industrial classifications at the individual level, which help to detect variations in
4The 2005 wave is a mini-census that covers 1 percent of the population. The reason why we do not use the 2000
population census, although available, is that tariff changes between 2000 and 2005 were not necessarily exogenous
since import tariffs had already reduced endogenously and remarkably even before China’s accession to the WTO.
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industry composition across regions so as to precisely measure regional exposures to changing
tariff rates.5 For the local labor market analysis, we aggregate individual-level data to the
prefecture level. We constrain our sample to the working-age population, defined as the age
group between 15 and 50, in order to make males and females comparable, since the compulsory
retirement age is 50 for women, 10 years less than that of men.
We complement the population census waves with firm-level data from the 1995 industrial
census and the 2004 national economic census, both collected by the NBS China. The former
covers all industrial firms operating in manufacturing and mining, while the latter covers
all firms economy-wide, which we restrict to the industrial sample. The firm census reports
detailed information on firm-level activities, including the number of male and female workers
within firms, four-digit industry codes, and geographical location. As before, we aggregate
firm-level data to the prefecture level of local labor markets. Compared with the population
census, the firm-level data allow us to explore heterogeneous effects on firms by different
ownership types, and therefore to investigate how privatization dynamics interacted with the
effects of globalization.
Further controls on local trade policy exposure are obtained from Brandt et al. (2017) and
Facchini et al. (2019). Industry-level data on NTBs and FDI restrictions have been provided
by Brandt et al. (2017). A further set of prefecture-level controls, including regional exposure
to measures of the NTR tariff gap (used to proxy market access to the U.S.), export licensing
requirements and the average government subsidy to exporters are taken from Facchini et al.
(2019).6 Nightlight data are derived from National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) and nightlights at the prefecture level are calculated as the simple average of all pixel
values within the boundary of each prefecture (Liao and Fei, 2019).
Concordant administrative codes for prefectures between 1990 and 2005 yield 322 prefectures
in total. We exclude seven prefectures with incomplete data,7 and four further prefectures in
which more than 75 percent of the local population worked in non-tradable sectors in 1990,
which makes the assumption of a perfect pass-through from the tradable to non-tradable sectors
less likely to hold (Kovak, 2013). This yields a final sample of 311 Chinese prefectures. See Table
A.1 in the Appendix for descriptive statistics on the main dependent variables and controls,
expressed as changes from 1990 to 2005, complemented by initial conditions in 1990.
3.2 Measuring regional tariffs and other trade policies
We build our main explanatory variable using tariff information from the World Integrated
Trade Solution (WITS). We obtain China’s import tariff rates at HS 6-digit level (for 5,224
products) over the period between 1992 to 2005.8 We calculate import tariffs at the level of 162
5The 1990 population census reports 328 3-digit Chinese industries.
6Facchini et al. (2019) provide prefecture-level data on all measures in 1999 and 2005. Given that 1999 is still
before China’s accession to the WTO, we use these shorter-term changes as proxies for long-run changes for the
purpose of robustness checks.
7These seven prefectures are all in the Tibetan region and are excluded due to missing data of control variables.
8China’s earliest import tariff rates are available starting in 1992, which we use as the initial tariff year for our
analyses.
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tradable sectors (available in the population census 1990) as the simple average of all products
within sector s. We combine tariffs on agriculture, and the industrial sectors (mining and
manufacturing) and decompose this measure for further robustness checks.
We transform sectoral import tariff rates, Tariff st, into prefecture-level import tariff exposure
by weighting import tariff rates in each sector s, using the initial level of sectoral employment








where Tariff pt denotes import tariff exposure in prefecture p in year t, Esp,0/Ep,0 is the
employment share of tradable sector s over total tradable employment in prefecture p during
the initial year of the sample. Focusing only on the tradable sector relies upon the assumption
that changes in the prices of tradable goods pass through to the local nontradables (Kovak,
2013).
The employment weighted import tariff adjustments exhibit substantial regional variation.
Following China’s WTO accession, prefectures that were most affected by import tariff
reductions (at the 95th percentile) experienced a reduction of 35.5 percentage points, whereas
in the least affected prefectures (at the 5th percentile) reductions amounted to about 25.0
percentage points (see Table A.2 in the Appendix). Figure A.2 in the Appendix displays
the geographical distribution of tariff reductions between 1992 and 2005. Southeastern
prefectures experienced larger tariff reductions on average than northwestern ones, reflecting a
concentration of industries more heavily exposed to tariff reduction in southeastern prefectures.
The large geographical variation in exposure to tariff reductions will contribute to identifying
the employment effects of trade liberalization in China.
For robustness checks, we include a series of further trade policy measures at the prefecture
level, all of which rely on a similar procedure as equation (1), using initial sectoral employment
shares to weight sectoral exposure to other trade policies (obtained from Brandt et al. 2017 and
Facchini et al. 2019). We measure regional export tariff exposure by first computing a weighted
average of all foreign tariff rates for each product (based on WITS), using the share of each
potential trading partner’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in world GDP as relative weights,
and then combining product-level tariff rates into a regional measure as in equation (1).
3.3 Empirical model
To estimate the long-run effect of trade liberalization on employment rates in China, we regress
the long difference in employment rates on tariff rate changes across prefectures using the
following specification:
∆Yp = α+ β∆Tariff p + X
′
p,0 Γ+ εp (2)
where ∆Yp denotes the prefecture-level change in a variety of labor market outcomes from 1990
to 2005 when calculated from the population census data and from 1995 to 2004 when based on
the formal industrial firm data. As our main dependent variables, we focus on male and female
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employment rates, further distinguished by age, skill, and firm ownership type. ∆Tariff p is the
percentage point change in import tariff rate exposure. Our coefficient of interest, β, measures
the impact of tariff rate reductions on employment rates. When distinguishing employment
by gender, we always estimate the regressions on male and female employment jointly, in a
seemingly unrelated regression framework, allowing for correlated (and robust) error terms.
This allows us to statistically test the difference between tariff coefficients for male and female
workers, which link to the gender employment gap directly.
Causal identification in this setting relies on prefectures being exogenously exposed to trade
liberalization, with differences in the effects of trade arising from variations in initial economic
structure. The first difference specification controls for all prefecture-level time-invariant
characteristics that may affect average labor market outcomes. For instance, it captures
spatial variation in social norms with respect to women’s roles as homemakers, which varies
strongly by geographic location (Chen and Ge, 2018). However, if there are unobserved factors
simultaneously correlated with both exposure to tariff reductions and employment dynamics,
our estimates will be biased. Endogeneity concerns may arise from two main sources. First,
employment dynamics may be determined by other initial economic conditions (e.g., the size
of the non-tradable sectors) that happen to be correlated with the initial industrial structure.
Second, local exposure to tariff reductions may be spuriously correlated with a series of further
policy changes.
We deal with the first concern by introducing a set of initial conditions in our baseline
specifications, Xp,0, which account for sources of spatial differences in labor market dynamics.
They include employment shares in the agriculture and tertiary sectors, which capture the local
size of the non-industrial and non-tradable sectors. Since China’s large scale privatization reform
in the late 1990s led to substantial lay-offs of workers, with considerable gender differences in
layoffs (Li and Song, 2013), we control for the initial employment share of SOEs to account for
the scope for the reform in the local labor market. To proxy for initial differences in economic
development, we use the regional intensity of nightlights in 1990 as a further control. In each
regression, we also control for the initial level of the dependent variable to allow prefectures
with different initial employment rates to follow different dynamics (Juhn et al., 2014). Initial
female employment rates ranged from 26.1 percent in Ningde Prefecture to 97.5 percent in
Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture according to the 1990 population census, resulting in
very different potentials for adjustment in female employment. Descriptively, prefectures with
a higher initial share of female employment were also more exposed to tariff reductions, since
female-intensive industries—e.g., textiles, clothing and apparel—were both relatively low in
skill intensity and also more protected (see Figure A.3).
We address the second concern by performing several robustness checks controlling for a series
of further globalization-driven policy changes that may be correlated with the prefectures’
exposure to import tariff reductions. Those variables include changes in regional exposure to
NTBs, export tariffs, NTR tariff gaps, subsidies to exporters, export licenses, and FDI restrictions.
Since tariff rate reductions are designed at the industry level and regional tariff rates are
calculated by re-weighting industry tariffs, the political economy of industry-level tariff
setting could also raise endogeneity concerns. Politically powerful industries may lobby the
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government and seek for more protection (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2005), which would result in
prefectures dominated by such industries experiencing lower tariff rate reductions, at least in
the short run. However, the nature of China’s trade liberalization left little room for lobbying, as
the target level of tariff rate reductions was pre-determined by the WTO negotiations such that
initially more protected industries experienced substantially larger tariff reductions (Brandt
et al., 2017). Hence, only the initial level of protection is likely to reflect political economy
considerations, whereas the overall tariff reductions over 15 years can be considered to be
fully determined by initial tariff levels. This is also supported by our tariff data. Initial import
tariff rates in 1992 and tariff reductions between 1992 and 2005 at the 3-digit industry level are
perfectly collinear (cf. Figure A.4, left panel), implying strong convergence in tariff rates across
industries. The right panel of Figure A.4 shows a similar pattern at the prefecture level, i.e.,
prefectures with a higher initial level of tariff rates experienced a larger decline. We also check
the robustness of our results using the initial tariff rates as an instrumental variable for tariff
reductions (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2005), which does not change our baseline results. Moreover,
controlling for the initial share of SOEs will also proxy for political connections at the prefecture
level. As SOEs are often closely connected to the government, they are more likely to lobby for
regulatory exemptions which potentially go beyond the effects of tariff reductions.
4 Results
4.1 Baseline results
Table 2 shows the gender-specific employment effects of trade liberalization by estimating
equation (2), using the changes in employment rates (in total and by gender) in the prefectures
as dependent variables. The models control for a set of initial conditions, including the initial
value of the dependent variable, as well as initial values of employment shares in the agriculture
and tertiary sectors, the employment share of SOEs, and nightlights, all measured in 1990 (see
Table A.3 in the Appendix for full results).
In terms of descriptive trends within our sample, employment rates among the working-age
population declined by about 10 percentage points over the 15 years period, with females
experiencing a 4.6 percentage points larger reduction than males. The estimated import tariff
coefficient is negative in the full sample (in column 1), indicating that larger exposure to
import tariff reductions resulted in smaller decreases in local employment. This average effect
masks substantial differences by gender. Column 2 shows that male employment rates did
not significantly respond to import tariff reductions, whereas female employment increased
more substantially with import trade liberalization (column 3). The difference between female
and male coefficients in the last column shows the extent to which import tariff reductions
contributed to a changing gender employment gap. The difference in tariff coefficients amounts
to 0.2, and is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. In a prefecture that has experienced
average tariff reductions, the employment gap between males and females is reduced by about
6.0 percentage points (−30.09× 0.20 = −6.02, see Table A.1). The gender employment gap
increased by 4.6 percentage points during the same time period, and so the contribution of
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import tariff reductions to reductions in the gender employment gap is economically sizable.
Table 3 reports regressions separately by age cohort and skill level, distinguishing between the
youngest cohort (aged 15 to 25), and two older cohorts (aged 26 to 35 and 36 to 50) as well as
between low-skilled workers (who did not complete high school) and high-skilled workers.
In terms of descriptive trends, the youngest cohort experienced very substantial declines in
employment rates of about 27 to 29 percentage points. This trend reflects a substantial increase
in tertiary education following the college expansion reform in the late 1990s (Ou and Zhao,
2016), which also increased upper-secondary enrolment and substantially delayed labor market
entry among the youngest cohort. Among most of the older cohorts, employment rates declined
by about 4 to 5 percentage points on average, with a somewhat larger decline among females of
prime childbearing age (26 to 35 years old) of 10.8 percentage points. When differentiating by
skill category, male employment rates among low-skilled workers fell by 8.8 percentage points,
while female employment rates among low-skilled workers fell by 12.6 percentage points; these
figures were 7.5 percentage points and 15.6 percentage points, respectively, among high-skilled
workers. This gender employment gap increased the most among the second cohort (26 to 35
years old) as well as among the high-skilled. These different gender dynamics may have also
been partly induced by changes in female labor supply, since improving incomes in emerging
economies often induce a drop in labor supply among females with family duties (Klasen, 2019).
The regression results in Panel A of Table 3 show that exposure to tariff reductions did not
affect the youngest age group and hence our results on the gender gap are not driven by the
large education expansion and employment declines within the youngest cohort. Results in
Table A.4 in the Appendix indeed document significant increases in education shares of the
young with increases in import competition, but not differences by gender. At the same time,
the rising import competition counteracted the trends in employment declines among the older
cohorts (in Panels B and C), increasing female employment by more than male employment,
which reduced the gender employment gap among both older cohorts. Import competition
seems to have affected low- and high-skilled workers on average to a relatively similar extent.
Although employment by low-skilled females responded somewhat more strongly than that
of high-skilled females, the effects of import competition on the gender employment gap are
virtually the same between the two skill groups.
The period of trade liberalization in China was accompanied by a major shift in production
from SOEs towards private firms. Our baseline results show that import trade liberalization
decreased the gender employment gap in the local labor market. We complement these results
by using data from the industrial census and the economic census to analyse whether changes
in the formal industrial sector contributed to these dynamics. Our period of analysis becomes
shorter due to data availability, since we focus on changes from 1995 to 2004. During this time
period, formal industrial employment decreased slightly for both genders, together with a
marginal increase in the gender employment gap (see Table 4, Panel A). The regression results
in Panel A are broadly comparable to the results on total prefecture employment based on
the population census (Table 2), although increases in male employment in formal enterprises
due to increasing market competition turn out somewhat larger and the gender difference
turns insignificant.
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However, privatization dynamics reveal substantial heterogeneity of the employment effects of
trade by gender. Parallel to improvements in global market access during the late 1990s and
early 2000s, China also implemented an extensive privatization reform, which has led to closures
of SOEs and a large number of lay-offs of workers formerly in state-employment (Chi and
Li, 2014). We test whether this ownership reform has also interacted with trade liberalization
by splitting formal employment by ownership status. From 1995 to 2004, SOE employment
declined among both males and females, with somewhat larger declines among males. At the
same time, employment expanded within private formal enterprises, with somewhat larger
increases in male employment compared to female employment.
Regressions of employment shares on tariff changes in Panel B of Table 4 show that
prefectures facing larger manufacturing import competition experienced larger reductions
in SOE employment. Although only the female coefficients are statistically significant, import
competition-induced decreases in male and female SOE employment are not distinguishable
from each other. At the same time, the competitive pressures arising from trade liberalization
have contributed to the employment expansion of private enterprises. Interestingly, among
private formal firms, import competition has triggered substantially larger increases in female
employment than male employment (Panel C of Table 4). These results highlight that tariff
reductions not only affected total female employment at the prefecture level, but more
specifically also drove female employment within private formal industrial firms.
4.2 Identification and robustness
Our results can only be given a causal interpretation if prefecture-level import tariff reductions
can be considered exogenous. The import tariff coefficients will be biased if the magnitude or
timing of tariff reductions was endogeneous, or if confounding trends were correlated with
the initial industry structure of prefectures. In the following, we discuss the relevance of these
concerns and present a series of robustness checks.
Upon accessing the WTO, China followed through on its obligation to reduce tariffs substantially,
without considerable exemptions, which alleviates concerns about the endogeneity of the
magnitude of sectoral tariff cuts. The timing of sectoral tariff cuts could have still been
endogenous though, with more influential industries experiencing later tariff reductions.
However, as we analyse long-run effects of tariff reductions over 10 to 15 years, our estimates
do not rely on short-run variation in tariff cuts. This is confirmed by the extremely high
correlation between initial levels of protection and tariff reductions both at the industry and at
the prefecture level from 1990 to 2005 (see Figure A.4 in the Appendix). A remaining issue arises
as China committed to reduce its tariffs until 2010, whereas our sample ends in 2005. If factors
that explain the delay in tariff reductions until the latest years were correlated with the sectoral
labor market dynamics, this would bias our estimates. In practice, however, this concern
also does not seem to have played a substantial role. The vast majority of tariff reductions
have been completed before 2005 while average tariffs have reduced by only 1.3 percentage
points between 2005 and 2010. Panel A of Table 5 controls for these two issues more formally,
using an instrumental variable regression approach and employing the average level of initial
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import tariffs (in 1992) as instruments for average import tariff reductions at the prefecture level
(following, e.g., Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2005 and Amiti and Cameron, 2012). Our results stay
practically the same when using this two-stage least square (2SLS) specification.
Even if tariff reductions were fully pre-determined, the structure of initial tariff protection
cannot be considered to be fully exogenous. Tariff protection has been substantially higher in
specific industries (e.g., tobacco, furniture, or textiles), and the initial spatial location of these
industries has been determined by a host of regional characteristics. These characteristics could
have both contributed to a larger exposure to tariff reductions and may have driven the long-run
trends in employment decline among both genders as well as the rising gender employment
gap. Omitting these characteristics from the regressions will result in omitted variable bias. We
address this concern first by controlling for a set of initial characteristics in all specifications,
including the initial level of the dependent variables, the initial share of SOE employment, the
initial employment shares in the agriculture and nontradable sectors, and initial nightlights to
proxy for general economic development.
As a further test, Panels B and C of Table 5 check for the link between the pre-trends in
employment and subsequent tariff reductions explicitly. Panel B presents the results from
a falsification test by regressing the change in pre-sample labor market outcomes (the pre-
trend in employment from 1982 to 1990) on the tariff changes over our sample period, with
the expectation that future tariff reductions should not be linked to changes in the gender
employment gap in the past. We calculate the historical male and female employment rates
based on the 1982 population census, which is also obtained from the IPUMS-International
database (Minnesota Population Center, 2019), and regress employment changes between 1982
and 1990 on tariff changes between 1992 and 2005. Results in Panel B show no correlation
between employment changes in the previous decade and import tariffs. To further verify
that our results are not driven by the long-run trends, we augment equation (2) by adding the
pre-sample trends in employment rates as further controls and report the results in panel C of
Table 5. The estimated coefficients are not sensitive to the inclusion of the pre-sample trends in
employment rates.
Table 6 re-estimates the main results from Table 2 by changing the underlying sample,
decomposing the tariff variable, and controlling for further possible policy confounders. First,
Panel A replicates our main results using the sub-sample of non-migrants only. The local labor
market approach in our specification assumes no migration across regions. In reality, workers
may move towards regions experiencing larger trade-induced increases in labor demand,
leading to an under-estimation of the effects of trade liberalization on employment. Due to the
presence of the household registration (hukou) system, inter-regional migration is highly costly
in China (Meng, 2012). According to the population census, migrants from other prefectures
(including those from other provinces) accounted for merely 2.5 percent of the working-age
population in 1990, although their population shares increased to 8.2 percent in 2005. When
focusing on the non-migrant sample only, the point estimates slightly decrease in magnitude
but the overall patterns remain the same.
In Panel B of Table 6, we decompose the import tariff reductions by their main sector into
agricultural versus industrial tariffs, the sum of which yields our original import tariff
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measure. The results show that female employment as well as the gender employment gap
are primarily driven by changing industrial tariffs and not by agricultural tariff changes and
hence competition dynamics within the industrial sectors were contributing to changes in
female employment.
Panel C of Table 6 introduces a list of further possible confounders that proxy for other
dimensions of trade-related policies that were instituted during the same time period. Our
measure for NTBs controls for regional exposure to reductions in non-tariff barriers (based
on Brandt et al., 2017), which could have mitigated but also reinforced the effects of tariff
reductions. On the export market access side, we measure aggregate export market access
through a weighted regional export tariff measure, calculated with respect to all potential
trading partners. Additionally, we control for changing access to the U.S. export market by
measuring the difference between tariffs applied within the “normal trade relations” (NTR)
framework that China qualified for and those applied towards non-market economies (from
Facchini et al., 2019). Changing export subsidies and export licensing requirements measure a
further dimension of export market access. Finally, we also control for the regional exposure to
reducing limitations on FDI (based on Brandt et al., 2017) as foreign firms may also increase the
demand for female labor (Juhn et al., 2014; Tang and Zhang, 2017).
The results show that only few of the above listed alternative policy channels are linked to
employment changes, and none of them explain gender-specific differences in employment
rates beyond the effects of import competition. The estimated coefficients of all controlled policy
variables are positive both for males and females (columns 1 and 2), but are largely insignificant
except for U.S. market access, measured by the change in the NTR gap for both genders, and
FDI restrictions for females. Declines in trade policy uncertainties in exports towards the
U.S. (measured by the NTR gap) are linked to lower employment rates for both genders. These
dynamics can be explained by the inflows of migrants, which surpassed increases in the demand
for workers within the local labor market (Facchini et al., 2019). Finally, the positive coefficient
on FDI restrictions suggests that, surprisingly, liberalizing foreign investment led to reductions
in female employment. One potential explanation could be that the technology effects of FDI
disproportionately increased the demand for high-skilled workers, but squeezed out even
more job opportunities for low-skilled females.9 More importantly for us, none of these policy
changes affected males and females differently, as shown in column (3). Our main findings
on the impact of tariff reductions remain unchanged, demonstrating that the gender-specific
employment effects of trade liberalization were not driven by other contemporaneous trade
policy changes, and hence are precisely identified.
In our prefecture-level regressions we focus on local averages and do not control for any
individual characteristics that determine individual employment decisions. As a further
robustness check, we rerun our baseline regressions using individual-level data from the
1990 and 2005 waves of the population census. Our dependent variable indicates individual
employment. We control for a rich set of individual characteristics, including age, age squared,
education level, hukou type, marital status, ethnicity, household head status, household size,
9These results are also in line with similar findings on the link between a strengthening of FDI regulations and
increasing employment in Indonesian districts (Genthner and Kis-Katos, 2019).
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and an indicator for being a migrant. Additionally, we include prefecture and time fixed effects
and a further set of prefecture-level initial conditions, shown in Table 2 as interaction terms
with the 2005 year dummy. The results are reported in Table A.5 in the Appendix and are fully
consistent with our main findings in Table 2. As before, import tariff reductions are not linked
to male employment but increase the probability of employment for females. Coefficient sizes
differ because individual-level regressions weight larger prefectures more heavily by default
whereas regional-level estimates treat each region symmetrically.10
5 Examining potential mechanisms
Stronger import competition could induce a relative increase in female employment for a
number of reasons. If sectoral employment is segregated by gender due to social or cultural
norms, and these gender norms persist, structural change that leads to an expansion of
historically female-intensive industries within the local labor market will mechanically reduce
the gender gap in employment. Under persistent gender segregation in the labor markets,
tariff reductions may disproportionately affect female employment if initially female-intensive
sectors expanded following trade liberalization. Alternatively, increased competition may
also contribute to a desegregation of sectors, either via a labor supply channel, by shifting
cultural norms and reducing the preference for segregated employment, or via labor demand,
by reducing discrimination against females and improving female labor market access. Aside
from simply causing desegregation, increasing competition may also reduce discrimination
directly, by increasing the willingness of all firms to employ females. A further possible
reason for a reduction in the gender employment gap could lie in technological upgrading.
Firms may respond to import competition by investing more in innovation or upgrading their
technologies (Bloom et al., 2016). This may benefit females by reducing males’ comparative
advantage in physical strength and improving job opportunities for females in occupations
that traditionally required intensive physical strength (Juhn et al., 2014). Finally, supply-side
responses at the household level can also contribute to a reduction in the gender employment
gap. As labor supply among adult females is generally more responsive to income shocks, if
import liberalization results in wage losses, it will lead to relatively more females staying in the
labor market.
We investigate these channels in two ways. First, we assess how changes in the factors listed
above were linked to exposure to import tariff reductions across prefectures, which provides
suggestive evidence on whether they could have contributed to changes in gender employment
gaps. As a second test, we also add the channel variables jointly to our baseline regressions for a
ceteris paribus investigation of within-prefecture dynamics. We provide these latter results only
for a comparison, and are fully aware of the limitations of their interpretability. Since all channel
variables responded endogenously to tariff reforms as well, their inclusion when controlling for
import tariffs does not allow for a precise attribution of the most relevant mechanisms at play.
10Using prefectures’ population as a share of the national population in 1990 as a weight in the regional-level
estimation yields similar results to those in Table A.5.
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5.1 Measurement of channel variables
We measure the mechanical expansion of female-intensive industries as a shift-share variable
(following Kis-Katos et al., 2018), where the share component consists of the initial female
intensity (share of females among all workers) of each two-digit sector s at the national level,
FIs0, measured in 1990.11 The shift component, Espt/Ept, measures the employment expansion
of each sector s within prefecture p across the two time periods:










This measure abstracts from total changes in employment within each prefecture and isolates
shifts in the sectoral distribution of employment. The change in this variable will be larger in a
given prefecture if sectors that used to be historically female-intensive (at the national level)
expanded locally over time.
As an additional measure, we assess the change in sectoral gender segregation by measuring
changes in a dissimilarity index that captures prefecture-level sectoral segregation of the
workforce by gender (e.g., Kis-Katos et al., 2018; Borrowman and Klasen, 2020):






where Mspt/Mpt and Fspt/Fpt denote the share of male and female workers in two-digit sector
s in prefecture p, respectively. The value of this index is scaled between 0 and 100, with a
larger value indicating higher sectoral segregation by gender. If trade liberalization reduced
sectoral gender segregation, this would indicate that females gained improved opportunities in
conventionally male-dominated sectors, or that males became more likely to enter originally
female-intensive sectors.
We proxy gender discrimination in the local labor markets more directly by building on
Hellerstein et al. (2002) and Hellerstein and Neumark (2006), approximating the local prevalence
of more discriminating sectors, identified via the amount of excess profits among firms
employing a larger share of females within each sector. The underlying assumption is that
within a sector that contains both discriminating and non-discriminating employers, non-
discriminating firms should be able to earn higher profits according to Becker’s (1957) theory
of discrimination. Hence, a larger profit differential between otherwise comparable firms that
employ more versus fewer females can be taken as an indication of a higher prevalence of
gender discrimination within that sector. To construct this measure, we rely on firm census data
from 1995 and 2004 and regress firm operating profits on the female share separately for each
two-digit sector s and year t, using the following specification:
Π f st = βst FSh f st + γstX f st + ε f st (5)
11Due to the fact that the 2005 mini census only reports two-digit sector codes, we can only calculate employment
shares of each two-digit sector within prefectures for 2005. We therefore aggregate the three-digit codes in 1990 to
two-digit codes.
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where Π f st denotes the inverse hyperbolic sine of profits obtained by firm f operating in two-
digit sector s and year t. Our main variable of interest is FSh f st, which measures the share
of female workers among each firm’s employees. The vector of controls X f st includes each
firm’s output share within the product market to measure its market power, categories of firm
age, its share of skilled employees, an indicator for exporter status and an indicator of private
ownership. We collect the industry- and year-specific coefficients β̂st, which capture time-
variant sectoral estimates of the relative strength of labor market gender discrimination against
females. A positive value of β̂st indicates the existence of discrimination against women. We
transform these sectoral discrimination coefficients, β̂st, into a prefecture-wide discrimination
index, DIpt, that computes the local prevalence of discriminating sectors by using industrial








By relying on time-variant employment weights, Espt/Ept, our prefecture-level discrimination
measure will decline if either employment shifts towards less discriminating sectors within
each prefecture or if within-sector discrimination declines at the national level (or both).
We capture upgrades in technology by focusing on the spread of computerization within
each prefecture.12 For this, we first compute the share of computers within the total value
of machinery for medium and large industrial firms within two-digit industries, provided
by China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology (1991, 1996, 2005, and 2006). In a
second step, we use the population censuses of 1990 and 2005, as well as the industrial and firm
censuses of 1995 and 2004, to measure the relative importance of each two-digit industry within
each prefecture and compute a prefecture-year specific index of computer intensity, CIpt:







which reweighs the sectoral computer intensity, CIst, by time-variant within-prefecture
employment shares, Espt/Ept, resulting in a direct measure of computerisation within
each prefecture.
We do not have good aggregate information that would allow us to precisely measure income
changes within these 311 prefectures over time. Although GDP measures at the prefecture-level
are reported in National Statistical Yearbooks, a substantial share of prefectures is missing this
information, especially in earlier time periods. We resort instead to a rough proxy of local
economic development that has been increasingly used as a proxy for economic activity and
welfare in the literature (e.g. Henderson et al., 2012; Donaldson and Storeygard, 2016), by
measuring nightlight intensity within each prefecture’s borders in 1990 and 2005 as a generic
proxy of economic activity and income.
12An alternative measure, focusing on technician-intensive occupations, yields qualitatively very similar results.
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5.2 Results
Table 7 shows the results from regressing each of the above channel variables on prefecture-
level import tariff exposure and the same set of initial conditions that we have used in our
previous analyses. Panel A of Table 7 focuses on the expansion of originally female dependent
sectors. Average trends (captured by the mean dependent variable) show that the share of
originally female-intensive industries declined within the local labor markets and within the
formal industrial sector, irrespective of ownership structures. The regression results reveal
a negative link between local import tariff exposure and the size of female-intensive sectors
within each location as well as the size of initially female-intensive employment within local
private industrial firms. Import competition was thus associated with an expansion of the
female-intensive production, both in the local economy and in the local private industrial
sector. This somewhat counteracted the general reduction in female employment, thereby
reducing the rise in the female employment gap as documented in Tables 2 to 4. This import-
competition induced expansion of female-intensive sectors may have contributed to an increase
in female employment, but only if sectoral gender segregation remained persistently present
throughout time.
The possibility of such an alternative dynamic is investigated in panel B of Table 7. The general
trends show a marked increase in sectoral gender segregation within the Chinese prefectures of
about 7.4 percentage points, but this dynamic was not driven by formal industrial firms, who
instead experienced a much smaller rise in gender segregation, and SOEs even experienced
a reduction in gender segregation. These descriptive changes, however, show evidence of
persistent gender segregation in the local market, thereby supporting the first channel of
import-competition induced expansion of female-intensive sectors. The regression results show
that import tariff declines and the resulting international market competition were linked to
reductions in the sectoral segregation of overall employment, and imply that females may
have gained improved job opportunities in traditionally male-dominant sectors. This is in
stark contrast to the within-industry results, as sectoral segregation tended to increase in all
formal industrial firms and among private companies with more import competition, although
these results are statistically insignificant. Together with the previous results, this shows that
within the private formal industrial sector, there was not only an expansion of female-intensive
industries but also an increase in gender segregation of employment, again potentially favoring
female employment.
These processes were accompanied by falling gender discrimination due to import competition.
As discrimination is approximated using firm-level profit data, we cannot compute this measure
for the entire local economy, but the trends reported in Panel C show substantial decreases in
average discrimination over time among all formal firms. With an initial average value of 9.0 in
1990, a reduction of 5.8 among all formal industrial firms indicates a decline by more than two
thirds in average discrimination against women. A similar pattern is observed for private firms,
whereas SOEs experienced the largest reductions in discrimination. The regression results
show that increases in import competition were significantly contributing to reductions in
discrimination among all firms and among private formal industrial enterprises. This result
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is in line with the expectation that discrimination by employers should respond strongly to
market competition (Becker, 1957).
In order to investigate the relevance of the technology channel, Panel D focuses on the local
expansion of computerization over time. Surprisingly, the trends show only minor aggregate
increases in technology (computer) intensity over the examined time period. However, there are
practically no changes among all formal enterprises, which masks substantial structural shifts
by ownership category: private formal enterprises increased their computer intensity more
substantially, which has been counteracted by comparable declines among SOEs. This also
shows that privatization and new firm formation was more prevalent in the more technology
intensive sectors. The regression results show that import tariffs induced competitive pressures
which contributed particularly to computerization of private formal enterprises, but were
negatively linked to the computerization of local SOEs. The results do not preclude the
possibility that technological change has also contributed to rising female employment among
private formal enterprises, although the same effects are less likely to have played a role in the
local economy as a whole.
Finally, relying on nightlight data, panel E shows an average increase in economic activity over
time. As compared to the initial average value of 2.4 (see Table A.1), an increase in nightlight
intensity of 2.0 indicates a growth rate of 83.3 percent for local economic activities, on average.
The regression results demonstrate that places exposed to larger import tariff reductions were
growing more quickly than others, and hence the average income effects of import competition
in the long run may have been positive. We would expect female employment to decline in
response to average increases in household incomes, as females of child-bearing age became
more likely to abstain from the labor market in the 2000s than in the previous decade. This
dynamic, however, would have resulted in a widening of the gender employment gap and
hence is unlikely to be the driving force behind our gender gap results. A remaining caveat
of this analysis is that at this aggregated level nightlights may be better able to capture labor
demand effects of increasing production and urbanization instead of potential supply-side
adjustments due to increasing household incomes.
Table A.6 in the Appendix presents an alternative set of results controlling jointly for each of
the above channels through various regressions of changes in gender-specific employment in
the local economy and in private formal industrial firms on import tariff changes. We focus
on these two types of employment as they have experienced the most consistent reductions in
the gender employment gap. We only view this evidence as suggestive, since all of the channel
variables responded to tariff reductions themselves (see Table 7), so our ability to provide a true
ceteris paribus comparison is rather limited in this setting. First and foremost, the negative link
between import tariffs and gender employment gap persists both within the local economy and
private formal industrial firms also when controlling for these channel variables. This could
point towards the importance of further explanatory factors, but also to possible limitations
in how we operationalize the selected channels. Additionally, several of the potential channel
variables are also correlated with gendered employment outcomes, even after tariff effects
are controlled for. The gender employment gap shrank in prefectures that were experiencing
the expansion of originally more female-intensive sectors (beyond what was predicted by
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tariff declines), as well as a decreasing gender segregation of employment at the level of local
labor markets (but not in private firms). None of the further factors are significantly different
across the genders: neither declines in gender discrimination, nor changing computerization,
nor general growth are linked to the gender employment gap once tariffs are controlled for.
Computerization coincided with a substantial expansion of private industrial employment
of both males and females, providing no additional evidence for new technologies having
particularly favoured female employment in China. Finally, increases in income as proxied
by nightlights are also linked to increases in both male and female employment, without any
notable gender difference.
6 Conclusion
Since the mid-1990s, China has undergone major trade reforms, liberalizing its trade regime
and opening its markets to global competition. These reforms were accompanied by substantial
structural change and a declining trend of employment rates both among males and females. As
females were leaving the workforce in larger numbers, potentially also driven by adjustments
of labor supply, China experienced a widening gender gap in employment over time. This
paper aims to link these two long-run dynamics and investigates to what extent labor demand
adjustments due to trade liberalization contributed to or counteracted this widening gender
employment gap. To this end, we employ a local labor market approach and relate changes in
local employment outcomes to regional exposure of tariff rate reductions. We focus on shifts in
total local employment (based on population census waves), but complement our results with
shifts in formal industrial employment (based on industrial and economic census waves).
In line with the emerging literature that finds gender-specific effects of trade liberalization in
developing countries (e.g., Juhn et al., 2014; Gaddis and Pieters, 2017; Kis-Katos et al., 2018;
Ben Yahmed and Bombarda, 2020), we find robust evidence that import tariff reductions fostered
female employment. Prefectures that were more strongly exposed to import tariff reductions
experienced reductions (smaller increases) in their male-to-female employment gap. Census
data on formal industrial firms reveals that increasing import competition was especially linked
to expanding private sector employment of females, with a shrinking gender employment gap
in private enterprises. These results are in line with several possible underlying explanations,
all linked to changes in labor demand and structural change. Part of these adjustments have
been mechanically driven by sectoral expansion in segregated labor markets, as China’s import
tariff reductions were linked to expansions of originally female intensive industries. Proxies
for sectoral gender discrimination also reduced with more import competition, very much
in line with theoretical expectations, whereas private enterprises responded to competitive
pressures with technological upgrading. Finally, import competition was linked to relative
increases in local economic activity (measured by nightlights). Our analysis cannot identify the
one main channel behind these results, but shows that all of these dynamics could have limited
the growth of a gender employment gap.
The findings in this paper shed some light on the unintended gender-specific employment effects
of trade liberalization in China and potentially in other developing countries. Existing literature
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finds that trade liberalization tended to widen inequality in developing countries (Goldberg
and Pavcnik, 2007). The import-competition induced reduction in the gender employment gap
as documented in this paper, however, implies that opening to the world economy may still
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Figure 1: Import tariff rates in China: 1992–2010
Notes: Product-level tariffs at the HS 6-digit level are mapped into 162 three-digit Chinese Industry Classification (CIC) industries.
The solid line shows the mean tariffs across industries and dashed lines show the 25th and 75th percentiles of tariffs. The dots
indicate the mean, 25th, and 75th percentiles of tariffs of the two years (1992 and 2005) used to calculate long-run tariff changes
in this paper. Data of product-level tariffs are from WITS.
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Table 1: Participation rate of working age population by gender: 1990 and 2005 (%)
1990 2005
Working status Male Female M-F Diff. Male Female M-F Diff.
Employed 90.35 84.83 5.53 81.86 71.55 10.31
Age cohort 15–25 79.14 80.04 -0.90 52.08 50.87 1.21
Age cohort 26–35 98.43 90.72 7.72 94.27 80.16 14.11
Age cohort 36–50 98.35 86.03 12.32 93.31 79.80 13.50
Unemployed 0.90 0.92 -0.02 2.09 1.69 0.40
Non-participation 8.08 13.90 -5.82 15.46 26.24 -10.78
Notes: This table shows the employment rate, unemployment rate, and non-labor force participation rate for working age
population (15-50, and by age cohort), by gender, in 1990 and 2005, based on the population census waves. All rates are
calculated as the share of male and female employed, unemployed and non-participants over male and female population,
respectively. Employment rates by age cohort are calculated as the share of male and female employed, for each age cohort, over
the male and female population of the corresponding age cohort.
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Table 2: Import tariffs and prefecture city-level employment rates, 1990-2005
Dependent: ∆ Employment rate
All Male Female M-F Diff.
(1) (2) (3) (2)− (3)
∆ Import tariffs -0.22** -0.13 -0.33** 0.20**
(2.32) (1.56) (2.48) (1.98)
Mean dependent (pp.) -10.24 -7.77 -12.40 4.63
Notes: Regression results are reported in columns (1) to (3), using robust standard errors. Columns (2) and (3) are jointly
estimated. The last column reports the difference in coefficients between regressions for males and females (gender employment
gap). Dependent variables measure the change in the share of employment within working age population (in total and by
gender), derived from the population censuses of 1990 and 2005. Initial conditions include the 1990 level of the dependent variable
(total, male or female employment shares), the share of SOE employment, employment shares of the agriculture and tertiary
sectors, as well as nightlights, all measured in 1990. N = 311. * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Absolute t values in parentheses.
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Table 3: Import tariffs and prefecture city-level employment by age and skill group, 1990–2005
Dependent: ∆ Employment rate
Male Female M-F Diff.
(1) (2) (1)− (2)
Panel A: Aged 15-25
∆ Import tariffs -0.02 0.11 -0.13
(0.10) (0.54) (1.27)
Mean dependent (pp.) -27.06 -29.20 2.14
Panel B: Aged 26-35
∆ Import tariffs -0.15** -0.56*** 0.40***
(2.15) (3.74) (3.22)
Mean dependent (pp.) -4.41 -10.81 6.40
Panel C: Aged 36-50
∆ Import tariffs -0.27*** -0.52*** 0.25**
(3.21) (3.54) (1.97)
Mean dependent (pp.) -4.86 -4.77 -0.09
Panel D: Low-skilled workers
∆ Import tariffs -0.15 -0.37** 0.22*
(1.53) (2.29) (1.77)
Mean dependent (pp.) -8.75 -12.56 3.81
Panel E: High-skilled workers
∆ Import tariffs -0.04 -0.31** 0.27**
(0.43) (2.18) (2.13)
Mean dependent (pp.) -7.50 -15.55 8.05
Notes: Regression results in columns (1) and (2) are jointly estimated using robust standard errors. The last column reports the
difference in coefficients between regressions for males and females (the gender employment gap). Dependent variables measure
the change in the share of employment within the selected age and skill groups (by gender), derived from the population censuses
of 1990 and 2005. We consider workers as high-skilled if they have completed at least high-school (upper secondary education).
All regressions control for the 1990 level of the dependent variable, initial SOE employment shares, initial employment shares
of the agriculture and tertiary sectors, and initial nightlights. N = 311. * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Absolute t values in
parentheses.
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Table 4: Employment shares in state-owned and private formal industrial firms, 1995–2004
Dependent: ∆ Employment rate
Male Female M-F Diff.
(1) (2) (1)− (2)
Panel A: In all formal industrial firms
∆ Import tariffs -0.21 -0.36** 0.15
(1.14) (2.53) (1.17)
Mean dependent (pp.) -1.61 -2.54 0.93
Panel B: In SOEs
∆ Import tariffs 0.09 0.08** 0.01
(1.13) (2.10) (0.24)
Mean dependent (pp.) -10.26 -7.85 -2.41
Panel C: In Non-SOEs
∆ Import tariffs -0.12 -0.36** 0.25**
(0.65) (2.56) (2.06)
Mean dependent (pp.) 8.66 5.31 3.34
Notes: Regression results in columns (1) and (2) are jointly estimated, using robust standard errors. The last column reports
the difference in coefficients between regressions for males and females (the gender employment gap). Dependent variables
measure the change in the share of employment in each type of industrial firms from 1995 to 2004, normalized by the working
age population (by gender). They are derived from the industrial economic census of 1995 and the economic census of 2004. SOEs
include both state-owned enterprises and collective-owned enterprises. Formal private firms include domestic private firms and
foreign-invested firms. All regressions control for the 1995 level of the dependent variable, initial SOE employment shares, initial
employment shares of the agriculture and tertiary sectors, and initial nightlights. N = 311. * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Absolute t values in parentheses.
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Table 5: Robustness checks: IV regressions and pretrends
Dependent: ∆ Employment rate
Male Female M-F Diff.
(1) (2) (1)− (2)
Panel A: ∆ Employment rate 1990–2005, 2SLS
∆ Import tariff instrumented by import tariff in 1992
∆ Import tariffs -0.12 -0.34** 0.21**
(1.44) (2.57) (2.08)
Mean dependent (pp.) -7.77 -12.40 4.63
Panel B: Pre-trends: ∆ Employment rate 1982–1990, OLS
∆ Import tariffs 0.02 -0.10 0.13
(0.24) (0.72) (0.87)
Mean dependent (pp.) -1.01 1.09 -2.10
Panel C: ∆ Employment rate 1990–2005, OLS
∆ Import tariffs -0.04 -0.32** 0.27***
(0.46) (2.37) (2.66)
Controlling for pre-trends Yes Yes
Mean dependent (pp.) -7.53 -12.03 4.50
Notes: Regression results in columns (1) and (2) are jointly estimated, using robust standard errors. The last column reports the
difference in coefficients between regressions for males and females (the gender employment gap). Dependent variables measure
the change in the share of employment within the working-age population (by gender), derived from the population censuses
of 1982, 1990, and 2005. They measure the pre-trends (between 1982-1990) in Panel B, and the contemporaneous trend (between
1990-2005) in Panels A and C. Tariff changes are measured from 1992 to 2005. In Panel A, they are instrumented by initial tariff
levels in 1992 (with first-stage a F-statistics of the excluded instrument being 1976.2). All regressions control for the initial level
of the dependent variable and initial employment shares of the agriculture and tertiary sectors, (measured in 1990 in panels A
and C and in 1982 in panel B). Panels A and C also control for initial SOE employment shares and nightlights in 1990. Panel C
additionally controls for the pre-trend in the dependent variable (from 1982 to 1990). In Panel A, N = 311; in Panels B and C,
N = 277. The reduction of sample size in Panels B and C is due to the fact that some prefectures in 1982 cannot be matched to the
1990 codes as a result of changes in administrative regions. * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Absolute t values in parentheses.
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Table 6: Robustness checks: Non-migrants, tariff decomposition, and further policy controls
Dependent: ∆ Employment rate
Male Female M-F Diff.
(1) (2) (1)− (2)
Panel A: Non-migrant sample
∆ Import tariffs -0.06 -0.26* 0.19*
(0.78) (1.91) (1.88)
Panel B: Decomposing import tariffs
∆ Industrial tariffs -0.11 -0.36*** 0.25**
(1.29) (2.68) (2.55)
∆ Agricultural tariffs -0.17 -0.21 0.04
(1.22) (0.80) (0.19)
Panel B: Further policy controls
∆ Import tariffs -0.18* -0.38*** 0.20**
(1.95) (2.71) (2.00)
∆ NTBs 2.15 1.90 0.24
(1.25) (0.77) (0.15)
∆ Export tariffs 0.16 0.39 -0.23
(0.40) (0.78) (0.78)
∆ NTR gaps 0.23** 0.31** -0.08
(2.32) (2.31) (0.86)
∆ Export subsidies 0.10 0.11 -0.00
(0.65) (0.42) (0.02)
∆ Export licenses 0.93 1.60 -0.67
(1.37) (1.20) (0.65)
∆ FDI restrictions 1.57 4.43* -2.86
(0.82) (1.70) (1.51)
Notes: Regression results in columns (1) and (2) are estimated jointly, using robust standard errors. The last column reports
the difference in coefficients between regressions for males and females (the gender employment gap). Dependent variables
measure the change in the share of employment within the working age population (by gender), derived from the population
censuses of 1990 and 2005. All regressions control for the 1990 level of the dependent variable, initial SOE employment
shares, initial employment shares of the agriculture and tertiary sectors, and initial nightlights. Panel A only considers non-
migrants, defined as persons living within the prefecture of their original registration. Panel B decomposes tradable tariffs into
agricultural and industrial tariffs. Panel C introduces further policy controls that measure changes in exposure to non-tariff
barriers (NTBs), changes in foreign tariffs on Chinese exports (weighted by trading partners’ market size), reductions in the trade
policy uncertainty faced by Chinese exporters that export to the U.S. (NTR gaps), changes in average government subsidies to
exporters, changes in domestic restrictions on direct exporting (export licenses), and changes in policy restrictions to FDI. N = 311
in panels A and B; N = 306 in panel C due to missing data of further policy controls. * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Absolute t
values in parentheses.
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Table 7: Channels: Changes in the local economy and in formal industrial firms
Measured within Local economy Formal industry SOEs Non-SOEs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Dependent: Expansion of female intensive sectors
∆ Import tariffs -0.15** -0.10 -0.05 -0.42***
(2.03) (1.25) (0.52) (2.84)
Mean dependent (pp.) -1.37 -1.42 -3.66 -6.46
Panel B: Dependent: Change in sectoral gender segregation
∆ Import tariffs 0.28** -0.24 0.12 -0.23
(2.18) (1.43) (0.69) (1.19)
Mean dependent (pp.) 7.42 1.70 -1.10 0.28
Panel C: Dependent: Change in discrimination
∆ Import tariffs 0.80*** 0.42 0.26**
(3.70) (1.21) (2.17)
Mean dependent -5.79 -8.60 -4.24
Panel D: Dependent: Change in computer intensity
∆ Import tariffs -0.04 -0.03 0.08*** -0.16***
(0.93) (0.98) (2.70) (5.41)
Mean dependent (pp.) 1.77 -0.57 -5.71 5.14
Panel E: Dependent: Change in nightlights
∆ Import tariffs -0.10**
(2.51)
Mean dependent 1.99
Notes: Regression results refer to the full local economy in column (1), to all formal industrial firms in column (2), to SOEs in
column (3), and to non-SOEs in column (4). Column (1) is based on population census data from 1990 and 2005, columns (2) to (4)
on formal firms in manufacturing and mining, derived from the industrial economic censuses of 1995 and 2004. All regressions
control for the initial level of the dependent variable, initial SOE employment shares, initial employment shares of the agriculture
and tertiary sectors, and initial nightlights. N = 311 except column (4) in Panel A where N = 307 due to missing non-SOEs
in four prefectures in 1995 and Panel C where N = 310 due to missing industrial firms in one prefecture in 1995. * p <0.1, **
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Figure A.1: Employment rate by gender in China: 1990-2015
Notes: This figure shows employment rates of youth and adults (aged 15 or above) by gender, and the difference between males
and females in China across years. Lines represent employment rates as estimated by the International Labor Organization (ILO);
and data markers represent employment rates from the population census waves (1990, 2000, and 2010). To make employment
rates from the population census comparable to the ILO estimates, we constrain our sample to all individuals aged 15 or above.
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Figure A.2: Map of tariff reductions (1992–2005) across Chinese prefectures
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Figure A.3: Tariff declines (1992–2005) and initial female employment shares
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Figure A.4: Import tariff declines (1992-2005) and initial tariff rates in China
Notes: Prefecture-level tariff rates are calculated according to equation (1).
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Table A.1: Summary statistics of key variables
Mean S.D. Min. Max.
∆ Import tariffs (pp.) -30.09 3.29 -47.09 -17.75
∆ Employment rate (pp.) -10.24 6.21 -25.48 13.96
∆ Male employment rate (pp.) -7.77 5.68 -20.76 21.76
∆ Female employment rate (pp.) -12.40 8.58 -32.98 30.58
∆ Male-female employment rate difference (pp.) 4.63 7.55 -36.81 37.15
∆ Female intensity (pp.) -1.37 2.66 -9.41 10.06
∆ Female intensity: Formal industrial sector (pp.) -1.42 3.45 -18.89 8.96
∆ Female intensity: SOEs (pp.) -3.66 4.42 -22.17 12.37
∆ Female intensity: Non-SOEs (pp.) -6.46 7.47 -35.74 16.41
∆ Sectoral gender segregation (pp.) 7.42 7.89 -16.80 29.34
∆ Sectoral gender segregation: Formal industrial sector (pp.) 1.70 6.79 -33.99 18.94
∆ Sectoral gender segregation: SOEs (pp.) -1.10 8.91 -33.69 33.35
∆ Sectoral gender segregation: Non-SOEs (pp.) 0.28 12.46 -41.43 48.07
∆ Discrimination: Formal industrial sector -5.18 15.68 -111.50 37.24
∆ Discrimination: SOEs -7.96 15.39 -120.99 40.84
∆ Discrimination: Non-SOEs -3.80 29.90 -226.15 54.87
∆ Computer intensity (pp.) 1.77 2.40 -1.70 13.06
∆ Computer intensity: Formal industrial sector (pp.) -0.57 1.33 -5.59 3.93
∆ Computer intensity: SOEs (pp.) -5.71 2.07 -11.54 1.93
∆ Computer intensity: Non-SOEs (pp.) 5.14 1.46 1.02 11.28
∆ Nightlights 1.99 2.70 -0.29 23.23
1990 agricultural sector employment share (%) 68.93 21.18 3.52 97.42
1990 tertiary sector employment share (%) 17.02 11.27 1.47 65.99
1990 SOE employment share (%) 75.73 9.80 41.64 95.43
1990 nightlights 2.40 3.81 0.00 35.59
Notes: Table lists selected key variables. N = 311. Source: Authors’ own calculation based on various datasources. Import
tariffs at the city level are calculated according to equation (1) using industry-level tariffs from WITS and the 1990 Population
Census. Employment rates by gender, female intensity and sectoral gender segregation are based on population censuses of 1990
and 2005. Computer intensity is based on sectoral computer usage, taken from the China Statistical Yearbook on Science and
Technology (National Bureau of Statistics, 1991b, 1996, 2005, 2006) and sectoral employment share within cities are calculated
based on the population census of 1990. Female intensity, sectoral gender segregation, computer intensity and discrimination for
formal industrial sectors, SOEs, and non-SOEs are all calculated based on the industrial census of 1995 and the economic census
of 2004. 1990 agricultural sector employment share and 1990 tertiary sector employment share are from the 1990 Population
Census. 1990 SOE employment share is from China City Statistical Yearbook of 1991 (National Bureau of Statistics, 1991a). 1990
nightlight density is calculated based on data from NOAA.
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Table A.2: Changes of city-level import tariff exposure: 1992-2005
Year 1992 (%) 2005 (%) Reduction (pp.)
Mean 40.01 9.92 30.09
95% percentile 45.87 10.51 35.51
75% percentile 41.35 10.25 31.21
50% percentile 40.05 10.17 29.92
25% percentile 39.30 9.80 29.35
5% percentile 33.78 8.41 24.95
Notes: The table shows prefecture-level tariff rates at the mean and different percentiles in 1992, 2005 and the differences between
the two years in percentage points.
Table A.3: Full baseline results including controls
Dependent: ∆ Employment rate
All Male Female
(1) (2) (3)
∆ Import tariffs -0.22** -0.13 -0.33**
(2.32) (1.56) (2.48)
1990 agricultural sector employment share 0.10** 0.06* 0.13**
(2.34) (1.75) (2.59)
1990 tertiary sector employment share 0.02 0.03 0.01
(0.33) (0.45) (0.14)
1990 SOE share 0.12*** 0.09** 0.12**
(2.96) (2.53) (2.44)
1990 nightlights 0.26** 0.26*** 0.23
(2.19) (2.80) (1.63)
1990 employment share -0.54***
(7.97)
1990 male employment share -0.76***
(9.78)
1990 female employment share -0.51***
(9.07)
Constant 13.42* 44.56*** 0.92
(1.88) (5.29) (0.13)
Mean dependent (pp.) -10.24 -7.77 -12.40
R2 0.27 0.34 0.37
Notes: Regression results are estimated using robust standard errors. Columns (2) and (3) are jointly estimated. Dependent
variables measure the change in the share of employment within working-age population (in total and by gender), derived from
the population censuses of 1990 and 2005. N = 311. * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Absolute t values in parentheses.
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Table A.4: Import tariffs and the expansion of education
Dependent: ∆ Student share
Male Female M-F Diff.
(1) (2) (1)− (2)
∆ Import tariffs -0.32* -0.41** 0.08
(1.78) (2.32) (0.85)
Mean dependent (pp.) 21.80 22.12 -0.32
Notes: Regression results in columns (1) and (2) are estimated jointly, using robust standard errors. The last column reports the
difference in coefficients between regressions for males and females (the gender education gap). Dependent variables measure
the change in the share of students within the population aged 15 to 25 (by gender), derived from the population censuses of 1990
and 2005. All regressions control for the 1990 level of the dependent variable, initial SOE employment shares, initial employment
shares of the agriculture and tertiary sectors, and initial nighlights. N = 311. * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Absolute t values
in parentheses.




Import tariffs -0.0007 -0.0047***
(0.89) (3.27)
Mean dependent 0.86 0.78
Observations 4,188,056 3,982,426
R2 0.36 0.22
Notes: Regression results in columns (1) and (2) are estimated jointly, using robust standard errors clustered at the prefecture-
city level. The dependent variables are indicator variables equal to one when an individual works. All specifications control for
individual characteristics, initial prefecture-characteristic specific trends, prefecture fixed effects, and a time effect. Individual
characteristics include age, age squared, education level, hukou type, marital status, ethnicity, household size, as well as
indicators for household heads and migrant status. Prefecture-level initial characteristics of 1990 include SOE employment
shares, employment shares of the agricultural and tertiary sectors, nightlight density, and initial male/female employment rates;
all are interacted with a year indicator. * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Absolute t values in parentheses.
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Table A.6: Controlling for potential channels
Dependent: ∆ Employment rate





(1) (2) (1)− (2) (3) (4) (3)− (4)
∆ Import tariffs -0.18** -0.49*** 0.31*** 0.32 -0.04 0.37**
(1.98) (3.25) (2.77) (1.62) (0.39) (2.48)
∆ Share of female intensive sectors 0.36*** 0.91*** -0.56*** -0.06* 0.03 -0.09***
(3.03) (4.95) (3.95) (1.81) (0.98) (3.96)
∆ Sectoral gender segregation 0.02 -0.17*** 0.20*** -0.05** -0.04** -0.01
(0.60) (2.74) (4.22) (2.26) (2.46) (0.64)
∆ Gender discrimination 0.05** 0.02 0.03 0.04*** 0.02** 0.01
(2.13) (0.76) (1.34) (2.63) (2.26) (1.37)
∆ Computer intensity 0.22 0.05 0.17 1.07*** 0.85*** 0.22
(1.30) (0.22) (0.99) (4.41) (4.08) (1.59)
∆ Nightlights 0.61*** 0.71*** -0.10 1.48*** 1.74*** -0.25
(3.28) (3.05) (0.58) (5.07) (5.26) (1.55)
Notes: Regression results in columns (1) and (2) are estimated jointly, using robust standard errors. The last column of each
Panel reports the difference in coefficients between regressions for males and females (the gender employment gap). Dependent
variables measure the change in the share of employment within the working-age population (by gender), derived from the
population censuses of 1990 and 2005. All regressions control for the 1990 level of the dependent variable, initial SOE employment
shares, initial employment shares of the agriculture and tertiary sectors, and initial nightlights. N = 310 for Panel A and N = 307
for Panel B. * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Absolute t values in parentheses.
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ONLINE APPENDIX
A Data generation and description of variables
Estimation sample Our main regression results are based on 311 prefectures of China. We first
concord the 1990 prefecture codes with the 2005 ones by combining prefectures in 2005
back to 1990 for split prefectures. This yields 322 prefectures. We exclude seven Tibetan
prefectures due to missing data of key variables, and further exclude four prefectures
with higher than 75 percent tertiary employment in 1990.
We concord prefecture city codes of 1995 and 2004 with those in the population census,
and obtain a final sample of 311 prefectures.
Measuring prefecture-level import tariff rates Our prefecture-level import tariff rates are
calculated in two steps. First, we calculate tariff rates at the 1990 sector level. We obtained
data on effectively applied tariff rates at HS 6-digit level in the years 1992 (the earliest
available year) and 2005 from the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) database. We
first concord the product-level tariff rates to 4-digit Chinese Industry Classification (CIC)
2002 version using the concordance table provided by Brandt et al. (2017).13 Tariff rates
at the 4-digit CIC level are calculated as the simple average across all products within
industries. We then map tariff data at the 2002 CIC level to the 1990 3-digit sector level
using our own concordance table. Again, tariff rates at the 3-digit sector level are simple
averages within sectors. In the second step, we calculate prefecture-level tariff rates
according to equation (1), which combines sectoral employment shares of tradable sectors
within prefectures in 1990 and time-variant sector-level tariffs.
In our robustness checks, we decompose tariff rates into industrial tariffs and agricultural
tariffs by using employment shares of industrial and agricultural sectors separately.
Measuring prefecture-level employment rates We measure employment rates in 1990 and
2005 based on the 1 percent random sample of the 1990 population census obtained
from IPUMS-International (Minnesota Population Center, 2019) and the 2005 mini
population census obtained from National Bureau of Statistics. Overall and gender-
specific employment rates at the prefecture level are calculated by dividing the total
number of employed by the size of the working-age population (in total and by gender).
Prefecture-level employment and population are aggregated using sampling weights.
Considering that the official retirement age is 50 years old for females and 60 years old for
males in China, we constrain working-age population to those aged between 15 and 50.
Employment rates by age group and by skill level are calculated similarly. We consider
workers as high-skilled if they have completed at least high school (upper secondary
education).
Employment rates in 1982 are aggregated from the population census of 1982, obtained
from IPUMS-International as well. Due to changes in administrative codes, we can only
13The concordance table provided by Brandt et al. (2017) has only manufacturing industries. We manually generate
a concordance table for agriculture and mining industries.
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identify 277 consistent prefectures with the 1990 codes.
Employment rates of formal industrial (mining and manufacturing) sectors in 1995 and
2004 are calculated based on the 1995 industrial census and the 2004 economic census
data, both obtained from National Bureau of Statistics. We aggregate the total number of
workers reported by each firm to the prefecture level (in total and by gender) and divide
it by the size of the working-age population (again aged 15-50). Working-age population
of 1995 is from the National 1% Population Sample Survey Statistical Book (1995). As
working-age population at the prefecture level is not available for 2004, we use data from
the 2005 mini population census instead. Employment rates of SOEs and private firms
are calculated based on firm ownership information. SOEs include both state-owned
enterprises and collective-owned enterprises. Private firms include domestic private firms
and foreign-invested firms.
Prefecture-level initial conditions 1990 employment shares of the agricultural and tertiary
sectors over total prefectural employment are calculated from the 1990 population census.
1990 SOE employment share denotes the share of SOE employment in total prefectural
urban employment. The data is obtained from China City Statistical Yearbook (National
Bureau of Statistics, 1991a).
Nightlight data are derived from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA). Prefecture-level nightlights are calculated as the simple average of all pixel
values within the boundary of each prefecture in 1990 and 2005.
Additional policy related control variables In our robustness checks, we control for a large
set of measures for the regional exposure to trade related policies, including NTBs, export
tariffs, NTR tariff gaps, government subsidy to exporters, export licensing requirements,
and FDI restrictions. Industry-level NTBs and FDI restrictions are from Brandt et al. (2017).
We employ a similar approach to equation (1) and calculate regional exposure to NTBs
and FDI restrictions by weighting industry-level NTBs and FDI restrictions using the
initial level of sectoral employment share within prefectures as weights.
We collect product-level export tariffs by country from the WITS database and construct
product-level export tariffs as the weighted average of foreign tariff rates using the relative








where Tsnt is the tariff imposed on China’s export product s by country n in year t. We
weight national tariff lines by the relative share of each country n in year t in world
GDP, GDPnt/∑Nn=1 GDPnt, to approximate the export market potential of various trading
partners. We then map the HS 6-digit product-level export tariff rates to the 1990 3-digit
sectoral level and calculate prefecture-level tariff rates following equation (1).
Prefecture-level measures of NTR tariff gap, government subsidy to exporters, and export
licensing requirements are obtained from Facchini et al. (2019) which are available for 1999
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and 2005. Given that 1999 is still before China’s WTO accession, we use these short-term
changes as proxies for long-run changes for the purpose of robustness checks. We have
data for 306 prefectures.
Measuring channel variables Expansion of female-intensive industries (FIpt) and sectoral
gender segregation (SIpt) are calculated using equation (3) and (4) using the 1990 and 2005
population census waves, and the 1995 industrial census as well as the 2004 economic
census. Since four prefectures had no private firms in 1995, we are only able to calculate
FIpt and SIpt for the private sector for 307 prefectures.
We estimate the sectoral level discrimination index following equation (5) using the 1995
and 2004 firm census data, and then compute the local degree of discrimination by using
time-variant industrial employment shares within each prefecture as weights following
equation (6). Since one prefecture had no industrial firms in 1995, the discrimination
measure is only available for 310 prefectures.
The local computer intensity measure is computed in two steps. We first calculate the
share of computers within the total value of machinery for medium and large industrial
firms within two-digit sectors, obtained from the China Statistical Yearbook on Science
and Technology (National Bureau of Statistics, 1991b, 1996, 2005, 2006). Then we use the
population census waves in 1990 and 2005, as well as the firm census waves in 1995 and
2004 to measure the relative importance of each two-digit sector within each prefecture
and compute a prefecture-level index of computer intensity following equation (7).
Lastly, we use prefecture-level nightlights as a proxy for local average income (derived
from NOAA).
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